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 Abstract 
College attendance is a risky investment. But students may not recognize when they are 
at risk for failure, and financial aid introduces the possibility for moral hazard. Academic 
performance standards can serve three roles in this context: signaling expectations for success, 
providing incentives for increased student effort, and limiting financial losses. Such standards 
have existed in federal need-based aid programs for nearly 40 years in the form of Satisfactory 
Academic Progress (SAP) requirements, yet have received virtually no academic attention. In 
this paper, we sketch a simple model to illustrate not only student responses to standards but also 
the tradeoffs faced by a social planner weighing whether to set performance standards in the 
context of need-based aid. We then use regression discontinuity and difference-in-difference 
designs to examine the consequences of SAP failure. In line with theoretical predictions, we find 
heterogeneous effects in the short term, with negative impacts on persistence but positive effects 
on grades for students who remain enrolled. After three years, the negative effects appear to 
dominate. Effects on credits attempted are 2–3 times as large as effects on credits earned, 
suggesting that standards increase the efficiency of aid expenditures. But it also appears to 
exacerbate inequality in higher education by pushing out low-performing low-income students 
faster than their equally low-performing, but higher-income peers. 
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College is a risky investment. Not only do prospective students face uncertainty about 
their likely income conditional on graduation (Wiswall & Zafar, 2015), but they also face 
significant uncertainty regarding how long they will persist and whether or not they will actually 
graduate. Uncertainty about completion exists because college is an experience good; 
prospective students may not discover their own tastes and abilities for college-level work until 
they try it (Altonji, 1993; Manski, 1989). College dropout is in part a manifestation of this 
uncertainty; scholars have long noted that some level of dropout is to be expected even in a well-
functioning postsecondary system, as students learn more about their preferences and abilities 
(Fischer, 1987; Manski, 1988, 1989; Manski & Wise, 1983).  
Even after enrolling and beginning this learning process, however, students may make 
suboptimal decisions about dropout for a number of reasons. Large and growing gaps in 
educational attainment by family income, which remain even after controlling for prior measures 
of ability, are consistent with credit constraints leading some students to end their schooling too 
soon (Bailey & Dynarski, 2011; Belley & Lochner, 2007). Moreover, students, like other people, 
may overly discount future payoffs when costly actions are required in the present (Lavecchia, 
Liu, & Oreopoulos, 2014). Finally, persistence and completion may generate positive social 
externalities in addition to the private benefits valued by students. Any of these factors could 
lead to suboptimal college enrollment and persistence, and form the justification for substantial 
public subsidies in higher education. 
Far less attention has been devoted to the question of whether some low-performing 
students might persist longer than they should. Yet the ubiquitous nature of academic 
performance standards at postsecondary institutions—which typically require students to 
maintain a minimum grade point average (GPA) or risk being placed on probation and eventually 
dismissed—suggests a widespread belief that they are needed. Students may not be well-
informed regarding institutional expectations for graduation and how their performance 
compares to it (Scott-Clayton, 2013). Alternatively, they may be informed procrastinators, 
always planning to increase effort next semester rather than in the present. In addition, evidence 
suggests that students are slow to update beliefs about completion probability even after a period 
of poor performance, because they underestimate the role of persistent rather than transitory 
factors (Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2012). Finally, the same public subsidies intended to 
promote enrollment and completion also introduce the possibility of moral hazard. Some 
students might persist in the “college experiment” beyond the socially optimal point. 
Academic performance standards can serve three roles in this context: sending a clear 
signal about institutional expectations for success, providing incentives for increased student 
effort early in college, and limiting financial losses (potentially for overoptimistic students 
themselves, as well as for taxpayers). Academic performance standards of one form or another 
apply to all students, regardless of financial aid status. But the stakes are arguably highest in the 
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context of financial aid policy, where performance standards are commonplace even in purely 
need-based programs. 
In this paper, we focus on the consequences of Satisfactory Academic Progress (SAP) 
requirements as established by the federal student aid system (“Title IV” aid). While eligibility 
for Pell Grants and student loans is initially based purely on financial need, recipients must meet 
SAP standards in order to continue receiving aid (state and institutional need-based programs 
often follow the federal rules as well). Institutions have flexibility regarding how they define and 
enforce SAP, but they commonly require students to maintain a cumulative GPA of 2.0 or higher 
and to complete at least two-thirds of the course credits that they attempt. Meeting SAP is a non-
trivial hurdle for many students: in earlier work, we find that 25–40 percent of first-year Pell 
recipients at public institutions have performance low enough to place them at risk of losing 
financial aid, representing hundreds of thousands to over a million college entrants each year 
(Schudde & Scott-Clayton, 2016). 
Though minimum performance standards have existed in the need-based federal student 
aid programs for nearly 40 years—and have become increasingly strict in recent years—we have 
found very little academic research specifically relating to their consequences, either theoretical 
or empirical. Bénabou and Tirole (2000) provide a model of how students react to performance 
standards in general, but do not consider interactions with financial aid policy. While there is a 
substantial literature on the impacts of performance-based scholarships, such scholarships 
typically focus on GPA thresholds well above 2.0 (Carruthers & Ozek, 2014; Cornwell, Lee, & 
Mustard, 2005; Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2008; Scott-Clayton, 2011) and 
examine the marginal effect of receiving extra aid rather than the effect of losing foundational 
need-based assistance (Angrist, Lang, & Oreopoulos, 2009; Patel & Valenzuela, 2013; Barrow, 
Richburg-Hayes, Rouse, & Brock, 2014; Barrow & Rouse, 2013; Richburg-Hayes et al., 2009). 
Nonetheless, this literature generally finds that students are responsive to performance 
incentives. A series of experiments with performance-based scholarships (provided as a 
supplement to Pell Grants) conducted by MDRC are particularly relevant given their low-income 
target population and 2.0 GPA threshold, which corresponds to the SAP threshold. In these 
studies, students assigned to the treatment group increased the time they spent on academic 
activities, earned more credits, and were more likely to persist (Patel & Valenzuela, 2013; 
Barrow et al., 2014; Barrow & Rouse, 2013). 
The most closely related empirical work is a study by Lindo, Sanders, and Oreopoulos 
(2010) of the causal effects of academic probation for students (regardless of financial aid status) 
at one large baccalaureate institution in Canada. Using regression discontinuity, the authors 
compare persistence, grades, and graduation rates for students just above and below the first-year 
GPA threshold for placement onto academic probation. The authors find that being placed on 
probation induces some students to drop out but increases GPA for those that return, with a net 
negative impact on graduation for students near the cutoff. A recent paper by Casey, Cline, Ost, 
and Qureshi (2015) replicates these findings using data from a U.S. public four-year institution 
but finds that some of the increase in GPA is due to strategic course selection. Finally, our own 
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recent work documenting the prevalence of SAP failure (Schudde & Scott-Clayton, 2016) 
includes an analysis of the effects of standards for Pell recipients in a different state than 
examined here, with our preferred strategy suggesting that the increases in dropout may be larger 
for Pell recipients than non-recipients. Taken together, these prior studies provide support for the 
Bénabou and Tirole model of student behavior, yet provide little guidance for evaluating 
standards in the context of financial aid policy. 
Our paper makes three contributions. First, we sketch out a simple model that not only 
illustrates students’ likely responses to performance standards but also highlights the tradeoffs 
faced by a social planner weighing whether to set performance standards in the context of need-
based aid. Our framework draws upon elements of Manski’s (1988, 1989) “schooling as 
experimentation” model as well as Bénabou and Tirole’s (2000, 2002) model of student behavior 
under performance standards. The model has three periods: an evaluation period, a warning 
period, and an enforcement period. Second, we use this framework to guide an empirical 
examination of the consequences of minimum performance standards for a high-risk population: 
community college entrants. Utilizing administrative records on aid recipients at more than 20 
community colleges in one state, we apply a regression discontinuity (RD) design similar to that 
used in prior work. However, our preferred estimates use a difference-in-difference (DID) design 
which uses unaided students as a control group to net out any effects of academic probation in 
general (that is, any effects of being below the performance threshold that affect all students, not 
just those receiving financial aid) and also allows us to estimate effects for students further away 
from the performance threshold. While the RD results are causally cleaner, the DID estimates are 
of greater policy relevance in terms of determining whether SAP requirements are effective 
overall. Finally, we examine a broader range of outcomes—including measures of student labor 
supply and the estimated value of foregone financial aid—that provide a fuller picture of the 
costs and benefits of the policy. 
In line with theoretical predictions and consistent with Lindo, Sanders, and Oreopoulos 
(2010), we find a clear pattern of heterogeneous effects of SAP failure during the warning period 
(when students should realize they are at risk but have not yet faced consequences), with students 
just below the GPA threshold being less likely to return in the second year, but with positive 
effects on grades for students who do return. Also consistent with our model, we find that 
discouragement effects are larger for students further below the threshold while encouragement 
effects appear larger for those nearest the threshold. 
Despite these heterogeneous effects in the short term, negative effects appear to dominate 
by the end of our three-year follow-up window, after the point at which consequences of 
continued SAP failure would have been enforced. Both the RD and DID specifications indicate 
significant reductions in the likelihood that students remain enrolled by that point, with no 
improvement in cumulative GPA. Interestingly, we find significant negative effects on credits 
attempted, but much smaller effects on credits earned, suggesting that the marginal credit no 
longer attempted had a low probability of being completed. Effects on degree completion are 
difficult to interpret because of potential floor effects, but the most consistent degree result is a 
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small negative effect on certificate completion. We find no effect on student earnings in most 
specifications, though coefficients are generally negative. 
Evaluating SAP policy as a whole requires weighing the value of human capital foregone 
against the cost of continuing to subsidize enrollment. While a complete assessment of net 
benefits is beyond the scope of this paper, if we assume that credits attempted but not completed 
have no value, then SAP does appear to improve the efficiency of aid dollars. The reduction of 
three credits attempted translates into a reduction of only one credit completed on average, yet 
saves at least $444–$539 in financial aid expenditures per student.1 Still, the small negative 
effects on certification completion may be cause for concern, since such credentials have been 
found to increase individuals’ post-enrollment earnings (Belfield, Liu, & Trimble, 2014; 
Jacobson & Mokher, 2009; Jepsen, Troske, & Coomes, 2014; Xu & Trimble, 2014). Moreover, 
policymakers may be concerned about the equity implications, as our results clearly indicate that 
aid recipients with low GPAs leave college more quickly than their similar but financially 
unassisted peers.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides additional 
background on SAP policy. Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework and key predictions. 
Section 4 describes our data, section 5 describes our empirical strategy, and section 6 presents 
our main results. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of policy implications and unanswered 
questions. 
 
2. Policy Background 
SAP regulations have been a part of federal student aid since 1976 when an amendment 
to the Higher Education Act of 1965 stipulated that students must demonstrate “satisfactory 
progress” toward a degree in order to continue receiving aid (Bennett & Grothe, 1982). The 
regulations give institutions flexibility regarding how they define SAP, though in practice it 
appears typical for institutions to require a cumulative grade point average (GPA) of 2.0 or 
higher and completion of at least two thirds of the course credits that students attempt (Schudde 
& Scott-Clayton, 2016). Our analysis will focus on the GPA criterion, as it is highly correlated 
with credit completion percentage in our sample (ρ = 0.79), but much more continuously 
distributed. 
                                                            
1 For comparison, note that a credit is 1/24th of a full-time school year, and in-state tuition in this system was less 
than $115/credit over this time period. This is a conservative estimate that assumes students who continue to enroll 
continue to receive aid (when in fact some students who remain enrolled may have lost their aid eligibility). We do 
not have measures of actual aid received beyond the first year. Instead, we use actual first-year aid receipt to 
estimate that students in our sample would qualify for approximately $140–170 in aid per credit attempted in 
subsequent years. 
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SAP policy applies to federal Pell Grant recipients, student loan borrowers, and work-
study participants; and state and institutional need-based aid programs often piggyback their 
minimum performance rules on the federal standards.2 While eligibility for federal aid is initially 
based purely on financial need, recipients must meet satisfactory academic progress (SAP) 
requirements in order to remain eligible beyond the first year. The federal Pell Grant is the single 
largest source of need-based financial aid in the country and the dominant form of aid received at 
most community colleges, both in terms of frequency and magnitude of awards (Baum & Payea, 
2013). Thus, while our empirical analysis groups together students receiving any type of aid,3 for 
interpretation purposes we recognize that most financial aid recipients in our sample are Pell 
recipients. For example, among the aid recipients in our community college sample, 70 percent 
received Pell, compared to 44 percent receiving state grants and 20 percent receiving loans. 
Average amounts among all aid recipients were $2,385 in Pell compared to just $407 in state 
grants and $352 in student loans. 
Until recently, institutions have had a great deal of flexibility in terms of how frequently 
they evaluate SAP and thus how quickly consequences are enforced. Prior to 2011, institutions 
were only bound to enforce SAP at the end of the second year; at that point, students whose GPA 
fell below the threshold for graduation could no longer receive aid.4 Many institutions 
nonetheless opted to evaluate SAP more frequently, often by the end of the first year, giving 
students another full year under either “warning” or “probation” status to try to meet the 
standard. A “warning” generally means a student is notified of their precarious status but no 
formal action is taken; “probation” means that the student failed to meet SAP requirements 
during the warning period and filed an appeal explaining their poor performance in order to 
continue receiving aid—though these terms were not always consistently applied.  
SAP standards layer on top of “academic good standing” policies that apply to all 
students regardless of aid status. Though community colleges are “open access” institutions, 
meaning that any individual with a high school diploma or its equivalent may enroll initially, 
they still have minimum academic standards that students must meet in order to remain enrolled 
and to earn a degree. In the state community college system (SCCS) that we examine, a 2.0 
cumulative GPA, or a C average, is required to earn a credential (this appears to be a fairly 
typical graduation standard at public institutions nationally). Students who fall below a 2.0 in any 
semester are placed on academic warning status and a notification will appear on their 
                                                            
2 In the state we examine, need-based state aid is the second largest source of student grants, and aid administrators 
confirmed that the state programs follow the same rules used for federal SAP. 
3 A prior version of this paper focused exclusively on Pell recipients and generated a substantively identical pattern 
of results; however, moving other aid recipients from the control group to the treated group helps improve power 
and is most consistent with how the policy is implemented in practice. 
4 Even defining the “end of the second year” is not particularly straightforward in the context of community 
colleges, where many students attend part-time. We found many policies were defined in terms of credits attempted, 
where 48+ would correspond to the end of the second year. 
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transcript.5 However, besides warning students that they are not on track to graduate, academic 
warning in this system has little durable consequence except for students on financial aid (who, 
prior to 2011, would lose aid after the end of two years). More immediate consequences are 
reserved for students who fall below a 1.5 GPA: these students may be immediately placed on 
probation and required to file an appeal in order to continue enrolling or receiving aid. Still, the 
system’s guidelines emphasize that even if an academic warning does not itself lead to dismissal, 
students will not be able to earn a degree with a less than 2.0 GPA.6 
Our review of college catalogs describing SAP and academic good standing policies 
suggests performance standards may be less than perfectly transparent to students; indeed, we 
found them challenging to decipher ourselves. In the years pertaining to our sample, policies 
appear to vary somewhat across colleges, and the thresholds and timelines for SAP evaluation do 
not always seem to correspond to the thresholds and timelines for broader institutional academic 
standards. We will return to this complexity in our discussion section. Nonetheless, for the 
period and sample under consideration, all students with below a 2.0 received at least some 
notification that they were at academic risk by the end of their first year; but students were 
unlikely to face binding consequences (such as financial aid loss or dismissal) before the end of 
their second year unless they fell below a 1.5 GPA. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
Basic Model of Performance Standards 
Bénabou and Tirole (2000) present a simple principal–agent model in which agents 
choose between shirking, a low-effort/low-benefit task, and a high-effort/high-benefit task. 
Lindo, Sanders, and Oreopoulos (2010) use an even simpler version of this model in their 
analysis of academic probation, focusing on the agent’s decision. Because of our interest in 
optimal policy, we utilize Bénabou and Tirole’s original model and examine its predictions after 
incorporating financial aid. 
In the original model, individuals choose one of these: shirking, which yields no costs or 
benefits; a low-effort/low-benefit task (Task 1) with a private benefit of V1 and a private effort 
cost of c1; or a high-effort/high-benefit task (Task 2) with private benefit of V2 and a private 
effort cost of c2. The principal bears no costs but receives a benefit of W1 from Task 1 and a 
benefit of W2 for Task 2. In other words, the ranking of costs and benefits is: 
                                                            
5 We find some conflicting information between policy manuals produced at the system level, which suggest 
students below 2.0 are placed on academic warning, and catalogs at the college level, at least one of which describes 
students as being in “good standing” as long as they maintain a 1.5 GPA (though they will not be able to graduate).  
6 Information on institutional academic good standing and SAP policies are taken from course catalogs for years 
prior to 2011.  
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0 < 𝑉1 < 𝑉2,      0 < 𝑊1 < 𝑊2,    𝑎𝑛𝑑       0 < 𝑐1 < 𝑐2  (1) 
Ability is conceptualized as an exogenously determined probability of success at either 
task, θ, which for now we assume the agent knows but the principal does not. To ensure that the 
problem does not degenerate and that at least some individuals choose each option, the following 
assumption is made (intuitively, this assumes that marginal cost of Task 2 relative to Task 1 is 
less than the marginal benefit, but the ratio of marginal costs to marginal benefits is higher for 





< 1        (2) 
The agent chooses the course of action that maximizes her individual outcome: max{0,𝜃𝑉1 − 𝑐1,𝜃𝑉2 − 𝑐2}     (3) 
So the individual will choose: 
𝑡𝑜 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑘:  𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝜃 < 𝑐1
𝑉1
≡ 𝜃1 
𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘 1:  𝑖𝑓 𝜃1 ≡ 𝑐1𝑉1 ≤ 𝜃 < 𝑐2−𝑐1𝑉2−𝑉1 ≡ 𝜃2   (4) 
𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘 2:  𝑖𝑓 𝑐2 − 𝑐1
𝑉2 − 𝑉1
≡ 𝜃2 ≤ 𝜃 
 
If the principal removes the low-effort/low-benefit option, individuals who would 
otherwise have chosen that option now are forced to choose between shirking or increasing their 
effort. Now, individuals will shirk only if: 
𝜃 < 𝑐2
𝑉2
≡ 𝜃∗      (5) 
The key insight of this model, which Lindo et al. (2010) emphasize, is the heterogeneous 
impact that results when performance standards are applied. Higher ability individuals are 
motivated to work harder, while lower ability individuals are discouraged and drop out. See 
Figure 1 for a graphical illustration. 
For our analysis, we are also interested in the principal’s perspective. Imposing a 
standard is only worthwhile for the principal if the increase in value coming from those induced 
to work harder exceeds the loss of value attributable to those induced to shirk. This depends not 
only on the parameters discussed above but also on the distribution of ability f(θ) in the 
population (i.e., how many individuals are in the affected ranges):  
𝑆(𝜃1,𝜃2) = �∫ 𝜃𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃𝜃2𝜃∗ � (𝑊2 −𝑊1) − �∫ 𝜃𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃𝜃∗𝜃1 � (𝑊1) > 0  (6) 
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Figure 1: Cutoff Values for Choosing Shirking, Task 1, or Task 2 in the Distribution of Ability  
Panel A. Task 1 Permitted (no standards) Panel 2. Task 1 Forbidden (standards) 
 
 
Introducing Financial Aid Without Standards 
The Pell Grant and other scholarship programs provide another means by which a social 
planner could encourage greater investment in education (either because of perceived 
externalities or because individuals systematically underestimate the true private benefit). If the 
social planner provides an upfront scholarship, P, based on enrollment but not outcomes (i.e., 
available to those who choose either Task 1 or Task 2 in the model), it is straightforward to show 
that this will result in a new 𝜃1𝑃 < 𝜃1, but 𝜃2𝑃 = 𝜃2 (see Figure 2). In other words, the scholarship 
induces more individuals into the low-effort/low-benefit Task 1, but no more individuals into 
Task 2. Manski (1988) also highlights a similar conclusion in his analysis of the effects of 
upfront, non-contingent enrollment subsidies: these “can induce students to change their 
enrollment decisions but cannot induce changes in completion decisions” (p. 13). As such, 
enrollment subsidies cannot guarantee the socially optimal outcome, but they may still be 
desirable (relative to no aid with no standards) if: 
�∫ 𝜃𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃𝜃1𝜃1𝑃 � (𝑊1) − �∫ 𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃𝜃�𝜃1𝑃 � (𝑃) > 0   (7) 
In essence, the new benefits attributable from those induced to enroll with low effort 
must more than cover the costs of providing the scholarship to all those who enroll, including 
potentially many individuals whose enrollment and effort are unaffected by the scholarship.7 
                                                            
7 If we consider Task 1 to be enrolling but dropping out and Task 2 to be persisting to completion, it is worth noting 
that a grant program could be worthwhile even if it increases dropout rates. Manski emphasizes that “dropout 
statistics per se carry no normative message…among [some] students, society prefers a higher dropout rate than that 
generated privately” (1989, p. 310, italics in original). 




Figure 2: Cutoff Values With Financial Aid P 
Panel A. Task 1 Permitted (no standards) Panel B. Task 1 Forbidden (standards) 
 
 
Adding Performance Standards in the Context of Financial Aid 
If the social planner can forbid low-effort enrollment in the context of financial aid, the 
threshold value for choosing the high-effort option declines to: 
𝑐2−𝑃
𝑉2
≡ 𝜃∗𝑃 < 𝜃∗      (8) 
Relative to providing a given P without performance standards, this policy is worthwhile 
if: 
�∫ 𝜃𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃𝜃2𝜃∗𝑃 � (𝑊2 −𝑊1) − �∫ (𝜃𝑊1 − 𝑃)𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃𝜃∗𝑃𝜃1𝑃 � > 0    (9) 
See Figure 2 for a graphical illustration. If W1, the social value of the forbidden low-
effort option, is lower than the value of the scholarship P, then aid-with-standards is 
unambiguously better than aid-without-standards. Assuming that there is some level of low effort 
that generates social value less than P, then performance standards are always desirable; the only 
question is where to set the dividing line between the acceptable W2 and the unacceptable W1. 
Intuitively, the optimal dividing line will depend upon the relative benefits of high-effort versus 
low-effort enrollment, the relative benefits of low-effort enrollment versus no enrollment, the 
shape of the ability distribution, and the magnitude of the scholarship.8  
                                                            
8 Note that it is not obvious that larger scholarships should necessarily warrant higher standards, because they enter 
into equation (9) not only directly but also indirectly: both the positively and negatively affected ranges shift lower 
in the ability distribution. 
θ1 θ2=θ2Pθ1
P θ1 θ* θ2=θ2Pθ1
P θ*P
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Timing and Other Unresolved Issues 
One ambiguity in the Bénabou & Tirole (2000) model is the timing of assessment and 
enforcement, and why we would ever observe students, even in the absence of aid, enrolling only 
to perform the “prohibited” low-effort task. Manski’s (1989) model of education as 
experimentation is useful here: students themselves may not know their ability until they enroll. 
We can thus think of the model being spread over three periods, with the first period being an 
evaluation period in which students learn about their ability, the second period being a warning 
period (in which individuals know their ability but still receive unconditional aid), and the third 
period being an enforcement period (in which aid recipients who do not improve above standard 
lose their aid). These periods are reasonably well-defined for aid recipients in our sample (as the 
first, second, and third year of follow-up). Note, however, that unaided students in our sample do 
not really face a defined enforcement period: unlike the probation policies examined by Lindo et 
al. (2010) and Casey et al. (2015), unaided students can continue taking classes under a warning 
status indefinitely, as long as their GPA does not fall below 1.5 (even though they will be unable 
to graduate with a GPA below 2.0). 
The model sketched above highlights how the interests of policymakers and students may 
sometimes diverge, and how performance standards may be socially desirable even while they 
necessarily reduce utility for at least some students. However, it is possible to imagine scenarios 
under which students themselves benefit from the enforcement of standards. For example, if 
students are slow to update beliefs about their own ability (as found by Stinebrickner & 
Stinebrickner 2012), they may actually benefit from leaving school earlier: they may reallocate 
their time from unproductive studies to more productive work in the labor market. This suggests 
examining changes in students’ labor supply during the warning and enforcement period. 
Implications 
In the context of SAP policy, we can think of earning less than a 2.0 GPA in college as 
the low-effort option. Our empirical analysis will not correspond directly to the model above, 
since individuals have a continuum of effort levels to choose from, and we do not have direct 
measures of ability or of the benefits associated with different effort levels. Nonetheless, the 
model suggests the following implications: 
1. Being placed on warning status will induce some individuals to drop 
out of school, while those who return will increase effort (as shown in 
Lindo et al. 2010). 
2. The discouragement (dropout) effects will be concentrated among 
those lower in the ability distribution, while the encouragement 
(improved GPA) effects should be concentrated among those near the 
threshold. 
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3. All else equal, encouragement effects of receiving a warning will be 
bigger in the presence of financial aid (evident by comparing affected 
regions of the distribution in Figure 2). 
4. All else equal, whether discouragement effects are bigger or smaller 
for the aid-eligible population during the warning period is 
ambiguous.9 
5. In the enforcement period, effects of failing the standard for aided 
students should be unambiguously more negative than for unaided 
students, as aided students experience the loss of aid. 
In addition to these hypotheses, the model also provides some insight regarding the key 
outcomes to consider from either a student or a social planner perspective. While persistence 
rates and GPA may be useful for testing the behavioral implications of the model, they are not of 
direct use in terms of evaluating the net benefits of the policy. For that purpose, we will consider 
summary measures of human capital accumulated, including total credits completed, cumulative 
GPA at the end of the follow-up period, and degree/transfer outcomes. We can then weigh the 
value of any impacts on human capital attained against the impacts on estimated scholarship 
outlays as well as on students’ foregone earnings. 
 
4. Data 
We utilize de-identified state administrative data on first-time students who entered one 
of more than 20 community colleges in a single eastern state between 2004 and 2010, and follow 
all students’ outcomes for three years after initial entry (unless otherwise noted). Only fall 
entrants are included in the data; however, the community college system classifies a small 
number of students who begin coursework in the summer as fall entrants. We focus on students 
who enrolled full-time in their first semester to ensure enough courses are attempted to compute 
a reliable first-year GPA (an additional justification is that performance standards may not be 
implemented until students have attempted at least 12 credits). The data include limited 
demographic information, detailed transcripts, placement test scores, information on financial aid 
received in the first year, and credentials earned. The state system also links these institutional 
data to two additional databases: the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC), which captures 
enrollment and credentials at institutions outside the state community college system, and 
individual Unemployment Insurance (UI) records, which indicate quarterly employment and 
earnings. We use the UI data to construct measures of student labor supply during the second and 
third years post-entry, to capture potential earnings foregone by students who remain enrolled. 
                                                            
9 Aid induces some low-ability students to enroll who are likely to drop out once standards are introduced; however, 
some moderate-ability students who would have enrolled even without aid are induced into the high-effort task 
when standards are introduced. 
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One thing the data do not include is any explicit measure of academic warning or 
probation. Instead, we infer who is subject to these labels based upon students’ cumulative grade 
point averages (GPAs). It is possible that not all students below the 2.0 GPA threshold were 
placed on a warning status, and that some students above the threshold were.10 To the extent this 
occurs, it will tend to bias our estimated effects towards zero. Similarly, we are not able to 
explicitly identify students who lost Pell eligibility as a result of SAP failure; while this would be 
interesting, it is not necessary for our analysis, which includes the initial threat of losing Pell 
(based on first-year GPA) as a key aspect of treatment rather than only considering students who 
experience the actual loss of aid. 
Table 1 describes our full sample and provides mean outcome levels for all full-time 
entrants to this state system as well as for reference groups relevant to our RD strategy (aid 
recipients and non-recipients +/- 0.25 around the cutoff) and DID strategy (recipients and non-
recipients with a GPA between 1.0 and 2.0). 
 
5. Empirical Strategy 
Because all students in our sample face performance standards by the end of their first 
year, and about 54 percent of our sample receives financial aid in their first year, we can 
compare the effects of introducing performance standards for aided and unaided students. The 
data suggest two possible approaches: regression discontinuity (RD) analysis for students just 
above and below the GPA threshold to remain in good standing, and/or a difference-in-difference 
(DID) analysis comparing students above and below this threshold for aid recipients versus non-
recipients. 
Regression Discontinuity 
The only assumption required is that the underlying relationship between first-year GPA 
and the outcome of interest (in the absence of the performance standard) is continuous through 
the threshold. Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we use a local linear specification with the 
bandwidth restricted to a narrow range around the 2.0 threshold. We focus on a bandwidth of 0.5, 
guided both by graphical plots as well as by the concern that other school policies may come into 
play below 1.5 or above 2.5. Still, we test for sensitivity to bandwidth selection by using the 
preferred bandwidth (0.5), half this bandwidth (0.25), and twice this bandwidth (1.0). For the 1.0 
bandwidth, we use a more flexible local quadratic specification (though it makes little difference 
if we stick with a local linear model). 
                                                            
10 As noted above, our analysis focuses on the GPA criterion, as it is highly correlated with credit completion 
percentage in our sample (ρ = 0.79) but much more continuously distributed. Thus, some students above 2.0 may 
still have received a warning. Students below the threshold should have received a warning, though there is always 
the possibility of some noise in the GPA calculation. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, State CC Sample (2004–2010 First-Time Full-Time Entrants)
  
Full Sample Near Threshold Below Threshold 
Variable Aided No Aid Aided No Aid Aided No Aid 
Background variables 
Age (Years) 21.0 19.9 19.9 19.1 20.1 19.0 
Female (%) 59% 46% 56% 42% 55% 40% 
White (%) 60% 73% 62% 74% 55% 72% 
Black (%) 29% 11% 29% 11% 35% 12% 
Hispanic (%) 5% 7% 6% 7% 5% 8% 
Avg. Total Aid Yr 1 ($) $4,083 $0 $4,158 $0 $4,111 $0 
Pell Recipient (%) 70% 0% 71% 0% 73% 0% 
Avg. Pell Amt. ($) $2,385 $0 $2,491 $0 $2,530 $0 
Cum. GPA<2.0,  Yr 1 29% 32% 45% 45% 100% 100% 
Comp. < 67% creds, Yr 1 37% 36% 41% 35% 72% 67% 
Failed  SAP, Yr 1 42% 42% 61% 59% 100% 100% 
Ever failed/wth, Yr 1 69% 68% 91% 90% 98% 98% 
Credits attempted, Yr 1 27.9 26.5 29.4 28.1 26.8 26.1 
Credits earned, Yr 1 20.6 19.7 20.8 20.5 14.9 15.3 
Took placement test 76% 71% 76% 73% 79% 75% 
Needs remed (predicted) 74% 64% 74% 63% 78% 66% 
Ever dual-enrolled 21% 14% 27% 18% 21% 15% 
Intent: Occ. Associate's 34% 33% 34% 32% 35% 33% 
Intent: Occ. Cert. 16% 10% 14% 8% 14% 9% 
Intent: Liberal arts AA/AS 50% 57% 52% 59% 51% 58% 
Outcome variables 
Enrolled, Fall Year 2 65% 68% 68% 76% 53% 66% 
Term GPA, Fall Year 2 2.25 2.25 1.95 1.99 1.60 1.63 
Credits Attempted, Fall Y2 9.3 9.6 9.0 10.4 6.3 8.3 
Credits Earned, Fall Y2 7.1 7.3 5.9 7.0 3.6 4.8 
School-Year Earnings, Y2 $2,043 $2,048 $2,080 $1,972 $2,013 $2,025 
Any Earnings, Y2 41% 40% 44% 41% 42% 42% 
Enrolled, Fall Year 3 36% 39% 41% 49% 30% 42% 
Term GPA, Fall Year 3 2.28 2.30 2.03 2.05 1.65 1.73 
Total Credits Attempted, Y3 8.23 8.67 8.91 10.95 6.25 8.94 
Total Credits Earned, Y3 6.37 6.65 6.40 7.77 4.24 6.05 
School-Year Earnings, Y3 $2,557 $2,541 $2,548 $2,543 $2,448 $2,588 
Any Earnings, Y3 41% 39% 43% 42% 42% 42% 
Total Credits Attempted, Y2-Y3 23.9 24.9 24.2 28.6 16.8 22.6 
Total Credits Earned, Y2-Y3 18.4 19.1 16.5 19.7 10.4 14.2 
Cumulative GPA, end of Y3 2.32 2.31 2.02 2.04 1.62 1.66 
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Table 1: (cont.) Descriptive Statistics, State CC Sample (2004–2010 First-Time Full-Time 
Entrants) 
Note. Source is author’s calculations using restricted SCCS administrative data, 2004–2010 first time fall entrants 
who initially enrolled full-time. “Needs remediation” is predicted based on student scoring below typical remedial 
cutoff scores in any of three possible tests. These may not correspond to actual cutoffs in use for a given 
school/cohort. Percentages computed only for those with at least one test score. 
 
The basic model, which we run on the sample restricted to aid recipients within the given 
bandwidth, takes the form: 
Yi = B0 + β1 (Belowi) + β2 (GPADistancei ∗ Belowi) + β3 (GPADistancei ∗ Abovei)  
+ CollegeFE + CohortFE + βnXi + εI (10) 
where Yi represents the outcome for student i, and β1 is the estimate of the effect of falling below 
the SAP cutoff on the outcome. CollegeFE is a vector of institutional fixed effects (entered as a 
set of dummy variables indicating the institution initially attended, with one institution 
excluded), important because the financial aid officers responsible for enforcing performance 
standards are nested within institutions. CohortFE is a vector of cohort fixed effects, a necessary 
inclusion because of potential changes in the student population over time. Xi represents a vector 
of individual-level covariates including race, gender, age at initial enrollment, whether students 
were exempt from placement testing in reading and math (indicators of prior achievement), 
placement test scores for those who were not exempt, whether the student was predicted to be 
assigned to remedial coursework, whether the student had previously enrolled as a high school 
student, and dummies for the student’s degree intent at entry (occupational associate’s degree, 
occupational certificate, or academic associate’s degree).11 We also include additional controls to 
capture elements of the student’s first year experience, including total credits attempted in the 
                                                            
11 Note we do not include controls for family income or students’ dependency status because these measures are 
missing for the 45 percent of students who did not file a FAFSA, including 75 percent of Pell non-recipients. 
Full Sample Near Threshold Below Threshold 
Variable Aided No Aid Aided No Aid Aided No Aid 
Earned Certificate, by Y3 10% 7% 6% 5% 2% 2% 
Earned AA/AS, by Y3 17% 17% 7% 9% 2% 4% 
Transferred to 4Yr, by Y3 22% 27% 14% 19% 10% 12% 
Still enrolled, Spring Y3 31% 32% 35% 42% 25% 35% 
Earnings, Y2-Y3 $7,111 $7,161 $7,183 $6,997 $6,874 $7,178 
Any Earnings, Y2-Y3 57% 53% 59% 55% 58% 57% 
Sample size 60,482 52,141 5,111 4,699 8,716 8,008 
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first year, whether the student worked for pay, and how much the student earned during the 
school year.12 We test the sensitivity of our results to models with and without covariates. 
Grade Heaping 
Using GPAs as the running variable in an RD introduces an additional challenge. Given 
the nature of the state’s grading system—in which only whole letter grades are awarded—we 
find “heaping” in whole number GPAs across the distribution, including at our cutoff value of 
2.0. Moreover, the fewer credits a student has attempted, all else equal, the more likely they are 
to have a whole-number GPA. This problem, however, is surmountable.13 Excluding students 
with precisely a 2.0, a McCrary test (2008) indicates the distribution of cumulative GPAs is 
continuous around the threshold. This suggests that the observed heaping is due to grading policy 
and not to students precisely manipulating whether they fall above or below the threshold. Thus, 
following the recommendations of Barreca, Lindo, and Waddell (2011; see also Barreca, Guldi, 
Lindo, & Waddell, 2011), we rely on “donut-RD” estimates, dropping observations with 
precisely a 2.0 GPA. Figure 3 shows the distribution of first-year GPAs for aid recipients and 
non-recipients before removing whole number GPAs. 
                                                            
12 These additional first-year controls make virtually no difference to the point estimates. Results available on 
request. 
13 Lindo, Sanders, and Oreopoulos (2010), Schudde and Scott-Clayton (2016), and Casey et al. (2015) all find 
similar patterns in their samples and implement similar donut-RD designs.  
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Figure 3: Distribution of GPA Before Eliminating Heaping at GPA = 2.0  
 
Note: Fitted lines are shown for aid recipients above and below the cutoff after disregarding GPA = 2.0. 
 
RD-Difference-in-Difference 
The RD estimates capture the total effect of performance standards for aid recipients, 
including general standards at the institution as well as the effects of SAP policy specifically. To 
directly test whether the estimated effects of performance standards are larger for aid recipients, 
we run the following pooled regression: 
Yi = B0 + β1 (Belowi* Aidi) + β2 (Belowi) + β3 (Aidi) + β4(GPADistancei ∗ Belowi* Aidi)   
+ β5 (GPADistancei ∗ Abovei* Aidi) + β6(GPADistancei ∗ Belowi* NoAidi) + β7 
(GPADistancei ∗ Abovei* NoAidi) + CollegeFE + CohortFE + βnXi + εI  (11) 
The β1 in this regression provides an estimate of the difference in the two RD estimates; 




The conceptual model suggests that encouragement effects should be strongest for those 
nearer to this threshold, while discouragement effects should be larger for individuals further 
below the threshold. Unfortunately, the RD is ill-equipped to test this important implication, 
because the RD estimates effects only for those right at the cutoff.14 The difference-in-difference 
allows us to examine the effect of performance standards for Pell recipients, over and above the 
effects for non-recipients, for a wider range of students affected by the policy. It also provides 
much greater power to detect effects than either the RD or the RD-DID. The cost of obtaining 
this broader estimate is that we must make stronger assumptions about the relationship between 
first-year GPA and subsequent outcomes, namely by assuming that the relationship between 
GPADistance and potential outcomes is the same for aided and non-aided recipients. We still 
allow for a very flexible relationship between GPA and potential outcomes by replacing the 
Below and GPADistance interactions from equation (11) with a set of fixed effects for GPA bins 
(with width of 0.05): 
Yi = B0 + β1 (Belowi* Aidi) + β2 (GPABin05i) + β3 (Aidi) + CollegeFE + CohortFE  
+ βnXi + εI  (12) 
For the difference-in-difference, we continue to limit the bandwidth above the cutoff to 
+0.5 GPA points; however, we vary the bandwidth below the cutoff from -0.15 to -1.0. This 
allows us to test our hypothesis that discouragement effects will be bigger in the DID relative to 
the RD-DID as we include students further below the threshold, while encouragement effects 
may be smaller. 
 
6. Main Results 
Graphical Analysis and Covariate Checks 
Figures 4–7 show average outcomes by first-year GPA in bins of 0.05 and with the size 
of the circles reflecting numbers of observations. In several of these graphs, the outcomes of aid 
recipients versus non-recipients appears to be more similar above the cutoff than below the 
cutoff, although it is difficult to discern sharp discontinuities visually. For example, reenrollment 
rates and credits attempted in Year 2 (Figure 4) and Year 3 (Figure 5) separately, as well as 
                                                            
14 Lindo et al. (2010) examine subgroups by HSGPA to get at this question, but are necessarily limited to the 
variation in HSGPA that exists for students around the specified college GPA performance threshold. Given the 
generally strong correlation between high school and college GPAs, such an analysis may be particularly susceptible 
to issues of measurement error.  
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measured cumulatively after 3 years (Figure 6), appear to fall more for aided students below the 
cutoff than for unaided students. In the bottom right panel of Figure 6 (showing whether students 
were still enrolled at the end of the follow-up), a clear negative discontinuity is evident for aided 
students but not unaided students. 
 
Figure 4. Fall Year 2 Outcomes 
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Figure 5. Year 3 Outcomes 
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In Table 2, we test for significant differences in pretreatment observable covariates under 
each of our main estimation strategies. The three columns of this table present “impact” 
estimates obtained by running equations (10), (11), and (12) above with the relevant background 
characteristic as the dependent variable. While we find no differences for most covariates, we 
find small positive difference in placement test scores for treated students in each specification. 
However, only about two-thirds of individuals have these placement test scores and the 
differences are small in magnitude (0.1–0.2 of a standard deviation). Gender, race, and ever dual-
enrolled also emerge as significant in at least one specification. Importantly, despite these small 
differences in covariates, we will show that it makes virtually no difference to our point 
estimates whether or not they are included as controls. 
 
Table 2: Covariate Balance Checks, Key Specifications 
 
Note. Source is author's calculations using restricted SCCS administrative data, 2004–2010 first time fall 
entrants who initially enrolled full-time. Test score rows are italicized because they are calculated only for 
those students who have test scores available (approximately 75 percent took at least one test). 
*** p < .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1 
RD (+/- 0.5) RD-DID (+/- 0.5) DID (+/- 0.5) 
Outcome Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E) 
Age 0.15 (0.20) 0 0.24 (0.24) 0 0.02 (0.09) 0 
Female 0.06 (0.02) ** 0.02 (0.03) 0 0.01 (0.01) 0 
White 0.02 (0.02) 0 0.04 (0.03) 0 -0.01 (0.01) 0 
Black 0.00 (0.02) 0 -0.01 (0.03) 0 0.02 (0.01) ** 
Hispanic -0.02 (0.01) * -0.01 (0.02) 0 0.00 (0.01) 0 
Missing race 0.00 (0.01) 0 -0.01 (0.01) 0 0.00 (0.00) 0 
Took reading test 0.01 (0.02) 0 0.00 (0.03) 0 -0.01 (0.01) 0 
Took writing test 0.01 (0.02) 0 0.00 (0.03) 0 0.00 (0.01) 0 
Took math test 0.01 (0.02) 0 0.00 (0.03) 0 0.00 (0.01) 0 
Reading score 1.40 (0.69) ** 1.14 (0.96) 0 0.88 (0.37) ** 
Writing score 3.95 (1.41) *** 2.71 (1.93) 0 0.30 (0.74) 0 
Math score 2.11 (0.98) ** 3.42 (1.53) ** 1.13 (0.57) ** 
Predicted to need remediation -0.05 (0.02) ** -0.04 (0.03) 0 -0.01 (0.01) 0 
Ever dual enrolled -0.02 (0.02) 0 -0.04 (0.03) 0 -0.02 (0.01) ** 
Intent: Occ AA/AS 0.01 (0.02) 0 0.01 (0.03) 0 0.02 (0.01) 0 
Intent: Occ certif. -0.01 (0.02) 0 0.00 (0.02) 0 -0.01 (0.01) 0 
Credits attempted, Yr 1 -0.06 (0.43) 0 0.07 (0.59) 0 -0.11 (0.20) 0 
Any earnings, Yr 1 -0.01 (0.02) 0 -0.01 (0.03) 0 0.00 (0.01) 0 
Earnings, Yr 1 -$112 (116) $0 -$18 (167) $0 $38 (63) $0 
Sample size 13,506 25,557 25,557 
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RD and RD-DID Results 
Table 3 provides the results from the RD and RD-DID specifications for several aspects 
of student behavior that our model suggests should be affected, measured separately during the 
fall of Year 2 (the first warning period) and Year 3 (the enforcement period when individuals 
could be actually prohibited from reenrolling or receiving aid) as well as cumulatively. The first 
column of the table shows our preferred RD specification, while the subsequent rows show 
alternative specifications. The final column shows the RD-DID results. 
We first examine reenrollment rates, term GPAs, and credits in the fall of Year 2. Note 
that for dropouts, term GPAs are imputed to the last known cumulative GPA (this ensures that 
impacts only come from those who reenroll, without introducing attrition bias). For aid recipients 
near the cutoff, failing SAP appears to have little effect on reenrollment decisions, or on 
continuous measures of credits attempted and completed (coefficients are consistently negative 
but generally very small in magnitude). However, we do find a significant increase of 0.07 GPA 
points (p = .06) in term GPA in the fall of the second year. Because this increase can only come 
from the 68 percent of students who reenroll, this implies a 0.10 GPA improvement among 
students who reenroll. This pattern of findings is quite stable across the RD specifications, 
though more pronounced in the narrow-bandwidth estimation. Notably, none of the Year 2 
estimates are statistically significant in the RD-DID, although the signs are generally consistent. 
However, by the fall of Year 3, any short-term GPA effects have washed out and more 
negative effects begin to appear. Most notably, we find a significant reduction of about 1.5 
credits attempted (about a 15 percent reduction) and about 0.8 credits completed (a 12 percent 
reduction). This is consistent with some students facing actual loss of financial aid during this 
year. The negative effects grow over this year to a large, highly significant 8 percentage point 
reduction in the likelihood of still being enrolled in the spring of Year 3, consistent across all 
specifications. Cumulatively, aid recipients just below the GPA cutoff in Year 1 attempt 2.2 
fewer credit and complete 1.4 fewer credits over three years than their counterparts just above 
the cutoff. We also find reductions of 2–3 percentage points in both certificate and associate’s 
degree completion, though statistical significance varies across specification. 
Finally, we examine school year earnings (measured in calendar Q4 and Q1 
corresponding to the relevant academic year, with the cumulative measure also including Q2 and 
Q3 between the second and third academic year) as a measure of the possible opportunity cost of 
enrollment (i.e., do students who drop out go back to working instead?). Effects here are positive 
in the preferred RD specification but not statistically significant in any specification, and even 
the sign varies across specification. The standard errors are quite large (often equivalent to about 
10 percent of mean earnings), and thus we are unable to conclude much about students’ labor 
supply from these results. 
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Table 3: RD-Estimated Effects of Failing GPA Performance Standard at End of Year 1, Aid 
Recipients Only 
 
Note. Source is authors' calculations using restricted SCCS administrative data, 2004–2010 first time fall entrants 
who initially enrolled full-time. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications use local linear regression 
with observations at precisely 2.0 GPA dropped. Control variables include all variables listed in Table 2: age, 
gender, race dummies, placement test scores if available, placement test flags, flag for predicted remedial need, flag 
for ever dual enrolled, first year credits attempted, first year employment status, and first year earnings. For term 
GPA estimates, term GPA is imputed to the last known cumulative GPA (this ensures that any impacts on this 
measure come only from students who reenroll without introducing attrition bias). 
*** p < .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1 
  
Preferred Bandwidth (+/- 0.5) Alternate BW (with covars.) RD-DID (0.5 bw) 
With Cov. No Cov. RD-0.25 RD-1.0 with covars   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Outcome Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E) 
Enrolled, Fall Year 2 -0.01 (0.02) 0 -0.01 (0.02) 0 -0.08 (0.05) * 0.00 (0.01) 0 -0.03 (0.03) 0 
Term GPA, Fall Year 2 0.07 (0.04) * 0.08 (0.04) ** 0.11 (0.09) 0 0.05 (0.03) ** 0.04 (0.06) 0 
Credits Attempted, Fall Y2 -0.36 (0.34) 0 -0.33 (0.34) 0 -0.98 (0.74) 0 -0.07 (0.23) 0 -0.76 (0.48) 0 
Credits Earned, Fall Y2 -0.12 (0.29) 0 -0.09 (0.29) 0 -0.52 (0.64) 0 0.09 (0.19) 0 -0.25 (0.42) 0 
Enrolled, Fall Year 3 -0.03 (0.02) 0 -0.03 (0.02) 0 -0.02 (0.05) 0 -0.04 (0.01) *** -0.02 (0.03) 0 
Term GPA, Fall Year 3 0.00 (0.03) 0 0.01 (0.03) 0 -0.04 (0.08) 0 0.02 (0.02) 0 -0.03 (0.05) 0 
Total Credits Att., Y3 -1.47 (0.50) *** -1.42 (0.51) *** -1.36 (1.09) 0 -1.43 (0.33) *** -1.63 (0.75) ** 
Total Credits Earned, Y3 -0.85 (0.42) ** -0.80 (0.42) * -0.65 (0.91) 0 -0.86 (0.28) *** -0.83 (0.62) 0 
Still enrolled, Spring Y3 -0.08 (0.02) *** -0.08 (0.02) *** -0.07 (0.05) 0 -0.06 (0.01) *** -0.08 (0.03) ** 
Cumulative GPA, end of Y3 0.00 (0.02) 0 0.01 (0.02) 0 0.02 (0.04) 0 0.03 (0.01) ** -0.02 (0.03) 0 
Total Credits Att., Y2-Y3 -2.16 (0.91) ** -2.07 (0.92) ** -3.25 (1.97) 0 -1.66 (0.60) *** -2.72 (1.32) ** 
Total Credits Earned, Y2-Y3 -1.35 (0.77) * -1.25 (0.78) 0 -1.86 (1.70) 0 -0.85 (0.51) * -1.34 (1.13) 0 
Earned Certificate, by Y3 -0.02 (0.01) * -0.02 (0.01) 0 -0.04 (0.02) * -0.01 (0.01) 0 -0.03 (0.01) ** 
Earned AA/AS, by Y3 -0.03 (0.01) *** -0.03 (0.01) ** -0.03 (0.03) 0 0.01 (0.01) 0 -0.02 (0.02) 0 
Transferred to 4Yr, by Y3 0.00 (0.02) 0 0.00 (0.02) 0 0.00 (0.04) 0 0.02 (0.01) ** 0.02 (0.02) 0 
School-Year Earnings, Y2 $83 (141) 0 $1 (165) 0 -$38 (296) 0 -$49 (095) 0 -$188 (202) 0 
Ln(earnings), Y2 0.00 (0.08) 0 -0.04 (0.09) 0 -0.13 (0.17) 0 -0.02 (0.06) 0 -0.16 (0.12) 0 
School-Year Earnings, Y3 $203 (188) 0 $112 (200) 0 -$398 (406) 0 -$21 (129) 0 -$63 (276) 0 
Ln(earnings), Y2 0.13 (0.09) 0 0.09 (0.09) 0 -0.05 (0.19) 0 -0.01 (0.06) 0 -0.02 (0.12) 0 
Earnings, Y2-Y3 $282 (440) 0 $12 (498) 0 -$620 (944) 0 -$134 (297) 0 -$555 (640) 0 
Ln(earnings), Y2 0.04 (0.08) 0 -0.01 (0.09) 0 -0.12 (0.17) 0 -0.02 (0.06) 0 0.01 (0.12) 0 
Sample size 13,506 13,506 5,111 24,673 25,557 
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Difference-in-Difference Results 
As discussed in section 3, a drawback of both the RD and the RD-DID is that effects are 
estimated only for students near the 2.0 threshold. Yet our model clearly predicts heterogeneous 
effects by ability. We expect encouragement effects to be strongest for students just below the 
threshold, while we expect discouragement effects to grow as we move further down the GPA 
distribution. Our DID specification enables us to capture the effects of SAP policy for a wider 
range of students affected. Our results are shown in Table 4, which varies the range of 
observations included below the threshold while keeping the bandwidth above the cutoff fixed at 
0.5. Results for specifications with no covariates are shown in Appendix Table A1, and are 
virtually identical. 
Indeed, the pattern of impacts on enrollment in fall of Year 2 suggests that 
discouragement effects are larger for students further below the cutoff. The estimated 5 
percentage point decline in reenrollment for the 0.15 bandwidth is statistically significant but 
grows to an 8 percentage point decline for the 1.0 bandwidth. Conversely, the 0.09 GPA point 
improvement for the 0.15 bandwidth falls to an insignificant 0.03 points for the 1.0 bandwidth. 
This pattern still shows, though much more weakly, in fall of Year 3. On the other hand, credits 
attempted and completed do not appear to vary much by bandwidth, either in the short or longer 
term. This may be because students near the margin may reduce their course loads in order to 
improve their GPAs. Overall, our preferred bandwidth of 0.5 (preferred because it captures a 
much wider range than the RD but avoids possible contamination from other policies for students 
below 1.5) suggests a decrease of 3.1 credits attempted and 1.1 credits completed after three 
years, similar to the RD-DID results. 
As in the RD and RD-DID, we find 2–3 percentage point reductions in certificate 
completion in the DID specifications. But in contrast to the RD and RD-DID, the DID suggests 
null or even positive effects on associates degrees and large positive effects on likelihood of 
transferring to a four-year institution. While in theory the DID examines an estimand of greater 
policy interest (measuring average effects for a greater range of students below the GPA 
threshold), it is surprising that any degree completion/transfer impacts would become more 
positive when we include students further below the threshold. Indeed, the impact on transfer is 
largest in the DID when the bandwidth is expanded to +/- 1.0 (see Table 4, column 4). The 
outcome graphs in Figure 7 provide an additional reason for concern: these degree and transfer 
outcomes appear to virtually bottom out at a GPA of 1.5 (a phenomenon not observed for our 
other outcomes).15 Aid recipients tend to have lower levels of degree completion/transfer than 
                                                            
15 While the rate of “transfer” is non-zero even for students with near-zero GPAs, we suspect this is because there is 
some baseline noise in the definition of the outcome, combined with true transfers bottoming out around 1.5. The 
noise may be due to students who co-enrolled at a four-year in their first year or even prior to their first year; or, 
because it is based on NSC data it is possible that some of these students have transferred to for-profit institutions. 
We are working to create a cleaner measure that would capture only transfer to a public/non-profit four-year 
institution after the first year. 
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non-recipients regardless of GPA, but the difference narrows as we move down the GPA scale 
towards 1.5. The DID will attribute this narrowing difference to SAP policy, when in fact it may 
simply be attributable to floor effects in the outcome. For this reason, we are hesitant to take the 
DID effects on degree completion/transfer at face value, even while we find the DID estimation 
credible for other outcomes. 
Finally, for student earnings we continue to see generally negative but insignificant 
estimates of a magnitude similar to what we found in the RD-DID. The notable exception is in 
the narrow bandwidth sample, for which we find very large and statistically significant 
reductions in earnings. Given that these enormous reductions do not show up in any other 
specification, are not visually discernable in Figure 7, and are in contrast with the prediction that 
labor supply should increase when students drop out, we prefer not to over-interpret this. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the earnings coefficients are, at least, quite consistent in their 
negative sign across all DID specifications as well as most of the RD specifications. This is 
suggestive of another channel for earnings effects besides the school–work time allocation 
tradeoff initially hypothesized. 
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Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
DID-0.15 DID-0.25 DID-0.5 DID-1.0 
Outcome Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E) 
Enrolled, Fall Year 2 -0.05 (0.02) ** -0.05 (0.02) *** -0.06 (0.01) *** -0.08 (0.01) *** 
Term GPA, Fall Year 2 0.09 (0.05) * 0.05 (0.03) 0 0.04 (0.02) ** 0.03 (0.02) 0 
Credits Attempted, Fall Y2 -1.12 (0.40) *** -0.98 (0.25) *** -0.91 (0.18) *** -1.01 (0.16) *** 
Credits Earned, Fall Y2 -0.28 (0.35) 0 -0.26 (0.21) 0 -0.16 (0.15) 0 -0.19 (0.14) 0 
School-Year Earnings, Y2 -$412 (162) ** -$103 (104) 0 -$97 (077) 0 -$45 (069) 0 
Ln(earnings), Y2 -0.23 (0.10) ** -0.08 (0.06) 0 -0.08 (0.05) * -0.04 (0.04) 0 
Enrolled, Fall Year 3 -0.03 (0.03) 0 -0.04 (0.02) *** -0.05 (0.01) *** -0.06 (0.01) *** 
Term GPA, Fall Year 3 0.02 (0.04) 0 0.01 (0.03) 0 -0.01 (0.02) 0 -0.02 (0.02) 0 
Total Credits Attempted, Y3 -1.76 (0.61) *** -1.79 (0.38) *** -1.62 (0.28) *** -1.58 (0.25) *** 
Total Credits Earned, Y3 -0.68 (0.51) 0 -0.85 (0.32) *** -0.82 (0.23) *** -0.82 (0.21) *** 
Still enrolled, end of Y3 -0.05 (0.03) * -0.06 (0.02) *** -0.05 (0.01) *** -0.05 (0.01) *** 
Cumulative GPA, End of Y3 0.04 (0.02) * 0.01 (0.01) 0 0.01 (0.01) 0 0.00 (0.01) 0 
Total Credits Attempted, Y2-Y3 -3.61 (1.08) *** -3.37 (0.67) *** -3.10 (0.49) *** -3.17 (0.43) *** 
Total Credits Earned, Y2-Y3 -1.34 (0.93) 0 -1.34 (0.57) ** -1.13 (0.42) *** -1.12 (0.37) *** 
Earned Certificate, by Y3 -0.03 (0.01) ** -0.02 (0.01) *** -0.02 (0.01) *** -0.02 (0.00) *** 
Earned AA/AS, by Y3 0.00 (0.01) 0 0.00 (0.01) 0 0.01 (0.01) 0 0.01 (0.01) ** 
Transferred to 4Yr, by Y3 0.02 (0.02) 0 0.04 (0.01) *** 0.04 (0.01) *** 0.05 (0.01) *** 
School-Year Earnings, Y2 -$412 (162) ** -$103 (104) 0 -$97 (077) 0 -$45 (069) 0 
Ln(earnings), Y2 -0.23 (0.10) ** -0.08 (0.06) 0 -0.08 (0.05) * -0.04 (0.04) 0 
School-Year Earnings, Y3 -$515 (220) ** -$186 (141) 0 -$127 (104) 0 -$167 (094) * 
Ln(earnings), Y3 -0.16 (0.09) * -0.08 (0.06) 0 -0.01 (0.05) 0 -0.02 (0.04) 0 
Earnings, Y2-Y3 -$1,332 (517) *** -$394 (328) 0 -$329 (243) 0 -$332 (219) 0 
Ln(earnings), Y2-Y3 -0.17 (0.09) * -0.06 (0.06) 0 -0.05 (0.04) 0 -0.02 (0.04) 0 
Sample size 16,326 19,223 25,557 31,562 
Table 4: DID Estimated Effects of Failing GPA Performance Standard at End of Year 1 (Above 
Versus Below for Aided Versus Unaided Students) 
 
Note. Source is authors’ calculations using restricted SCCS administrative data, 2004–2010 first time fall entrants 
who initially enrolled full-time. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients shown are on the interaction 
term aided*below. Aid status is based on first year awards and includes all forms of aid. Range of data above the 
cutoff is held fixed across specifications at 0.5; range of data included below the threshold varies by model. All 
specifications include fixed effects for first-year GPA bin in increments of 0.05, with observations at precisely 2.0 
GPA dropped. Control variables include all variables listed in Table 2: age, gender, race dummies, placement test 
scores if available, placement test flags, flag for predicted remedial need, flag for ever dual enrolled, first year 
credits attempted, first year employment status, and first year earnings. For term GPA estimates, term GPA is 
imputed to the last known cumulative GPA (this ensures that any impacts on this measure come only from students 
who reenroll without introducing attrition bias). 
 
*** p < .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1 
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Figure 7. Degree Completion and Earnings Outcomes, End of Year 3 
 
Note. Aid recipients are in gray; non-recipients are in black. “Earnings, Y2–Y3” includes zeros and covers six 




In this paper, we attempt to provide a conceptual framework for thinking about the role 
and consequences of imposing performance standards in the context of financial aid. The 
framework suggests that some minimum standard is desirable. Determining whether a standard is 
too high or too low will require weighing the value of encouragement effects for those who are 
motivated to work harder against the discouragement effects for those who are induced to 
dropout. 
Consistent with the model and with prior research by Lindo, Sanders, and Oreopoulos 
(2010), we find behavioral effects in the expected directions that are particularly strong in the 
first term after a warning is issued, the fall of the second year. Also consistent with our 
theoretical model, student responses to performance standards appear to be larger for students 
receiving financial aid (seen by comparing the RD-DID specifications to the RD). 
Discouragement effects appear larger, and encouragement effects smaller, when we include 
students further below the GPA threshold (seen by comparing DID specifications of different 
bandwidths). In our preferred DID specification (Table 4, third column), aid recipients who fail 
the SAP grade standard are 6 percentage points less likely to reenroll in the second year, but 
second-year GPAs rise by 0.04 points compared with similar unaided students. These results are 
also consistent with Schudde and Scott-Clayton (2016), which applied a DID specification to 
examine SAP policy in a different state and found significant negative effects on reenrollment 
and positive (but small and insignificant) effects on GPAs in the second year. 
Over the longer term, our results across all specifications suggest reductions of about 
three credits attempted and one credit earned after three years. This pattern suggests that students 
are discouraged from attempting credits they were unlikely to complete, and thus SAP policy 
may improve the efficiency of aid distributed. If we multiply the decline in credits attempted by 
an estimate of students’ per-credit aid eligibility, the decline corresponds to a $440–$530 decline 
in estimated aid disbursed per student in the second and third years. For comparison, $440–$530 
is four to five times the tuition cost of one credit, which was below $115 for this sample and 
timeframe. Moreover, this could be a conservative estimate of the cost savings since tuition itself 
is subsidized, and because even some of the students in our sample who reenroll after failing 
SAP may have done so without aid. 
Still, our findings generate a number of dimensions for possible concern. First, we 
consistently find declines of about 2–3 percentage points on certificate completion for aided 
students who fail SAP. Because of the shorter length of these programs (often one year or even 
less), the second year may already be too late to recover if students have a below-standard GPA 
at the end of the first year. Recent estimates of the labor market payoff to certificates, using an 
individual fixed-effects approach, suggest an earnings gain of perhaps $1,400 annually for 
certificate completers (Di & Trimble, 2014; though it is not clear whether these gains might be 
bigger or smaller for students on the margin of failing SAP). If only 2–3 percent of the sample 
experiences this loss, it would take over a decade for the earnings losses to outweigh the 
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financial aid savings on average. Still, some individuals are clearly worse off as a result: the 
discouragement effects of the policy mean that some students who could have earned a degree 
are dissuaded from reenrolling. The concentrated consequences they experience may outweigh 
the social benefit of reduced aid expenditures, which are dispersed across many. Moreover, it is 
possible that the students who are least likely to earn a degree are those that benefit the most 
from doing so (Brand & Xie, 2010).   
More generally, it does not appear to be the case that students themselves receive much 
benefit from SAP policy. The short term improvements in GPA are not sustained over the long 
term; the isolated positive impact on transfer is sensitive to specification and follows a pattern 
that suggests it may be spurious. Regarding the negative effects on credits and enrollment, in 
theory, students with a low likelihood of completing the courses they attempt might benefit from 
leaving school sooner rather than later in order to devote more time to gaining experience in the 
labor market. However, we find little evidence of any positive effects on labor supply; indeed, 
most point estimates on earnings were negative.  
Taken broadly, the pattern of effects here suggests that SAP policy is at least partly doing 
its job (at least from the perspective of a social planner who weights all students equally): 
minimizing unproductive reenrollments while providing some encouragement for students to 
perform better. This hardly implies that SAP policy is optimized, however. Our review of college 
catalogs, as well as anecdotal reports from college staff, suggests that many students may not 
learn about SAP until they lose aid. If true, this is a missed opportunity: if students are poorly 
informed it will mute the incentive effects of standards, and the longer it takes for students to 
realize they are failing, the harder it will be for them to get back above the GPA threshold.  
From an equity stance, the implications of SAP policy are complex. Poor academic 
performance is widespread across student demographics. SAP policy targets undergraduates 
from America’s most disadvantaged families (median family income among aid recipients in our 
sample is about $28,000). Students who are reliant on federal financial aid face the consequences 
of academic standards more quickly than students who can afford to pay for college out of 
pocket. A student with unlimited funds can, theoretically, continue to enroll in community 
college for as many iterations as necessary to attain the 2.0 cumulative GPA required for 
graduation. A student who relies on federal funding to cover tuition expenses ultimately receives 
fewer chances to “get it right.” While SAP standards may help some students avoid 
overinvesting time, money, and energy into college schooling, it also may also prevent students 
from economically disadvantaged households from an equal chance at earning a diploma. 
Heterogeneous effects within the economically disadvantaged group may further exacerbate 
inequality: though we cannot examine it here, prior work by Barrow & Rouse (2013) suggests 
that students with children are less able than those without children to shift their time allocation 
toward academics in order to meet performance incentives.  
Finally, an open question is how the effects of SAP may be different following a 
significant tightening of the standards in 2011 (too late for us to examine in our sample). Federal 
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regulations now specify that SAP status must be evaluated at least once annually; only those 
institutions evaluating more than once per year can use a “warning” status (and then only for one 
term); and students who file a successful appeal may be placed on “probationary” status only for 
one term (Satisfactory Academic Progress, 2012; U.S. Department of Education, 2014). In effect, 
the new regulations mean that students who fail SAP cannot receive aid for more than one 
subsequent term without filing an appeal; even if the appeal is successful, students can only 
receive aid for one additional term unless they improve sufficiently to pass the SAP standard. 
Because of these changes, SAP policy is likely to affect more students more quickly than it has 
in the past.  
These changes could be beneficial if students are encouraged to improve earlier in their 
college careers, but they could be detrimental if enforcement is so draconian that students do not 
have sufficient time to improve. Nor is it clear what would happen if standards were set at a 
higher level such as 2.5, above the GPA typically required for graduation, as was recently 
proposed by the Obama administration with respect to the President’s “free community college” 
proposal. What is certain is that SAP policy is not going away, and may affect even more 
students in future years—so the stakes are high to understand its impacts for both students and 
public coffers.  
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Table A1. DID Estimated Effects of Failing GPA Performance Standard At End of Year 1, No Covariates
DID-0.15 DID-0.25 DID-0.5 DID-1.0
No Cov. No Cov. No Cov. No Cov.
Outcome Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E)
Enrolled, Fall Year 2 -0.05 (0.02) ** -0.05 (0.02) *** -0.06 (0.01) *** -0.08 (0.01) ***
Term GPA, Fall Year 2 0.10 (0.05) ** 0.05 (0.03) * 0.04 (0.02) ** 0.03 (0.02) 0
Credits Attempted, Fall Y2 -1.15 (0.41) *** -0.98 (0.25) *** -0.89 (0.19) *** -1.03 (0.16) ***
Credits Earned, Fall Y2 -0.27 (0.35) 0 -0.25 (0.21) 0 -0.15 (0.16) 0 -0.21 (0.14) 0
Enrolled, Fall Year 3 -0.03 (0.03) 0 -0.04 (0.02) *** -0.05 (0.01) *** -0.06 (0.01) ***
Term GPA, Fall Year 3 0.03 (0.04) 0 0.02 (0.03) 0 -0.01 (0.02) 0 -0.02 (0.02) 0
Total Credits Attempted, Y3 -1.73 (0.61) *** -1.76 (0.38) *** -1.63 (0.28) *** -1.61 (0.25) ***
Total Credits Earned, Y3 -0.64 (0.51) 0 -0.82 (0.32) ** -0.84 (0.23) *** -0.85 (0.21) ***
Still enrolled, end of Y3 -0.05 (0.03) * -0.06 (0.02) *** -0.05 (0.01) *** -0.05 (0.01) ***
Cumulative GPA, End of Y3 0.04 (0.02) ** 0.02 (0.01) 0 0.01 (0.01) 0 0.00 (0.01) 0
Total Credits Attempted, Y2- -3.59 (1.10) *** -3.31 (0.69) *** -3.07 (0.50) *** -3.24 (0.45) ***
Total Credits Earned, Y2-Y3 -1.25 (0.95) 0 -1.25 (0.58) ** -1.12 (0.43) *** -1.18 (0.38) ***
Earned Certificate, by Y3 -0.03 (0.01) ** -0.02 (0.01) *** -0.02 (0.01) *** -0.02 (0.00) ***
Earned AA/AS, by Y3 0.00 (0.01) 0 0.00 (0.01) 0 0.01 (0.01) 0 0.01 (0.01) *
Transferred to 4Yr, by Y3 0.03 (0.02) 0 0.04 (0.01) *** 0.05 (0.01) *** 0.05 (0.01) ***
School-Year Earnings, Y2 -$384 (195) ** -$38 (121) 0 -$77 (091) 0 -$45 (082) 0
Ln(earnings), Y2 -0.18 (0.10) * -0.06 (0.07) 0 -0.06 (0.05) 0 -0.03 (0.04) 0
School-Year Earnings, Y3 -$505 (235) ** -$145 (150) 0 -$122 (112) 0 -$178 (101) *
Ln(earnings), Y3 -0.13 (0.10) 0 -0.08 (0.06) 0 -0.01 (0.05) 0 -0.02 (0.04) 0
Earnings, Y2-Y3 -$1,272 (589) ** -$236 (371) 0 -$292 (277) 0 -$351 (251) 0
Ln(earnings), Y2-Y3 -0.13 (0.10) 0 -0.04 (0.06) 0 -0.04 (0.05) 0 -0.02 (0.04) 0
Sample size 16,326 19,223 25,557 31,562
